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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Shopping Center Not Open to
First Amendment Activities Unrelated to Use
Respondents distributed handbills in petitioner's shopping
center which contained numerous commercial businesses and
professional offices and included a large surrounding parking
area dissected and bounded by public streets and sidewalks. The
handbills, which were distributed in the interior mall area, in-
vited the public to a meeting to protest the draft and the Vietnam
war. Petitioner's security guards told respondents that they
would be subject to arrest for trespass1 if they continued the dis-
tribution and suggested they transfer their activity to public
streets and sidewalks on the exterior. In an action brought by
respondents charging violation of their first amendment rights,
the district court held that the shopping center was "the func-
tional equivalent of a public business district" and therefore
open for the exercise of such rights.2 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.3  The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that there had been no dedication of peti-
tioner's shopping center to public use which would entitle re-
spondents to exercise free expression unrelated to the center's
operations, especially where adequate alternative means of com-
munication existed. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) .4
Although the rights guaranteed by the first amendment have
been said to occupy a preferred position,5 they are not absolute.0
1. Pursuant to the PoRTLAND, ORE., POuCE CODE § 16-613.
2. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
3. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
4. The Court was divided 5-4. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the
opinion for the Court. Marshall, J. dissented in an opinion in which
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, J.J., joined.
5. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(194S).
6. The clear and present danger test and the fighting words doc-
trine demonstrate that not every form of speech will be protected. For
the former see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The principle was
restated in the most recent case:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra at 447 (footnote omitted). Speech which
consists of "fighting" or insulting words likely to incite the hearer to
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In deciding what activity should be protected, courts often bal-
ance the interests involved 7 taking into consideration the man-
ner s and place 9 in which the rights are asserted as well as the na-
ture and degree of the interference with the rights of others.10
fight is not constitutionally protected. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942). But see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949),
where the Court said freedom of speech is protected "unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
7. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Even where the conduct is
found to be protected, reasonable regulation will be permitted. See,
e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
8. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965), where the
Court said:
We emphatically reject the notion ... that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those
who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling,
marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these
amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech.
Picketing which is done in an oppressive or coercive manner is not
protected. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). However, conduct which is
not disruptive or disorderly may be protected. Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966). The more the activity involves conduct as op-
posed to pure speech, the less likely it is to be protected. See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Public Service Comm'n v. Polak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952),
where first amendment rights were said to be limited by the rights of
others when traveling in a public conveyance and Kovaks v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949), where the Court stated that the use of sound trucks in
a residential neighborhood would be an impermissible interference
with the right of privacy.
There is no absolute right to use public places for first amendment
activities even though they have long been associated with such use.
On the one hand the Supreme Court has stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing pub-
lic questions.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). On the other hand, even state-
owned property will not always be an appropriate place to assert such
rights, and the state may prohibit communicative activities in places
not suited to them. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The basic standard used to determine
where expressive activities may be carried on is whether or not they
would interfere with the use to which the property is dedicated. Ad-
derley v. Florida, supra at 47.
10. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Metropolitan
[Vol. 57:603
CASE COMMENTS
Before the protection of the first amendment applies, there
must be a finding of "state action"'" which may arise from direct
or indirect state involvement, from the state's delegation of its
functions to a nonpublic entity, or under the concept of public
use. There is no clear agreement as to the nature and degree of
state involvement required, but the Supreme Court has gone so
far as to find state involvement where a state leased space to a
discriminator.1 2  Some commentators would classify the mere
use of a state trespass law as state action.1 3 Under the delegation
of function doctrine, functions which are uniquely governmental
in nature, such as the provision and operation of parks, transit
systems, and the elective process, may not be delegated to a pri-
vate individual or institution without the concomitant carry-
over of first amendment rights.14 Closely related to this doc-
Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
886 (1949).
11. The first amendment was intended as a restriction solely on
the federal government, but it has been applied to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507(1948); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
13. Some have interpreted Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
to mean that there is state action whenever a state enforces private
discrimination. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962). This line of reasoning may be
carried over into the first amendment area:
[W]henever a state court is presented with a choice one res-
olution of which would serve to prevent racial discrimination,
the fourteenth amendment subjects to review as state action
the choice of the other resolution. If, analogously, the individu-
al's right to be free of unconstitutional infringement of first
amendment expression runs against any state choice not to
vindicate the free exercise of that expression, then ... a state
court [may be barred] from aiding private action that threatened
to infringe free speech ....
The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rrv. 63, 133 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (park); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (elective process); Public Service Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (transit system); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944) (elective process); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) (cafeteria in courthouse).
Under the delegation of function doctrine a state may be held ac-
countable under the fourteenth amendment for its failure to act.
"[W]hen a state permits this kind of private activity it must couple
the permission with certain restrictions. If these are not supplied, the
Court will supply them ... ." Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLmvL L. ERr. 1083, 1097 (1960).
Justice Douglas has gone so far as to suggest that retail stores and
restaurants perform a function similar to common carriers, so that, even
though privately owned, they may be open to the exercise of first
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trine is the public use concept under which private property
which has been opened to the public may become subject to the
provisions of the first amendment.
The public use concept originated in Marsh v. Alabama,",
where, in addition to noting that the state had "permitted" a pri-
vate corporation "to use its property as a town,"' the Court said,
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it." 1 7 On such quasi-public property, ownership rights must
sometimes yield to first amendment activity. 18
In deciding Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza,'9 the first Supreme Court case to deal
amendment activities. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275-79
(1963) (concurring opinion).
15. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness was con-
victed under the Alabama trespass law for failing to leave the sidewalk
of a company town where she was distributing religious literature. The
conviction was upheld by the Alabama Court of Appeals and certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court of Alabama. The United States Su-
preme Court reversed on the ground that the town served a public
function so close to that of an ordinary municipality that the restraints
of the first and fourteenth amendments must be held to apply. The
Court observed that the town consisted of a "business block" as well as
a residential area, streets, and a sewage system and that "the town and
its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in
general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town
and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property be-
longs to a private corporation." 326 U.S. at 503.
16. Id. at 507.
17. Id. at 506. The Court continued:
Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes
and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does
his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primar-
ily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially
a public function, it is subject to state regulation.
Id. (Footnote omitted).
18. The policy reason for the development of this theory has been
said to be the desire to allow continued protection for free expression in
a time of changing patterns of commercial development. A finding
that property is quasi-public permits the courts to balance the compet-
ing values of free speech and property rights in each case. Note, Free
Speech: Peaceful Picketing on Quasi-Public Property, 53 MINN. L. REv.
873, 880-81 (1969).
19. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Logan involved a union engaged in the
peaceful picketing of a nonunion supermarket in Logan Valley Plaza.
Pickets patrolled in the parcel pickup area and the adjacent parking lot
until the supermarket and Logan obtained an ex parte order from the
Court of Common Pleas of Blair County which in effect restricted
their activity to grassy berms adjacent to the public roads surrounding
the center. After a hearing, the court continued its injunction based on
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with expressive activity in a shopping center, the Court based
its holding on the public use concept. In Logan, the Court up-
held the right of a union to picket a particular store on the cen-
ter's property, reasoning that the center was comparable to the
company town in Marsh because it "serves as the community
business block 'and is freely accessible and open to the people in
the area and those passing through."' 2 0  Therefore, the Court
continued, communicative activities conducted therein were pro-
tected by the first amendment but could be limited to expression
"in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the
use to which the property is actually put."2 1  It was not clear
from the opinion, however, whether the "consonant with use"
limitation meant that first amendment activities would be al-
lowed so long as they did not interfere with the normal use of the
property or that they would be permitted only if their message
related to the use to which the property was put.2 2
In a sense Justice Powell's majority opinion in Lloyd clari-
fied the ambiguity created by Logan. The Court distinguished
Marsh on the ground that it involved a peculiar situation because
it dealt with a company town, "an economic anomaly of the
past,"23 which encompassed all of the components and services
characterizing any other town.2 4 While the decision in Logan
the protection of property rights and what it held was unlawful coercion
to join the union. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on the sole
ground of trespass. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held
that the berms were too far from the supermarket to allow its patrons
to read the union's message and that the pickets were placed in danger
by having to walk in close proximity to traffic. "Naked title" was
not a sufficient interest to justify the interference with the union's
interest in communication. Id. at 324.
20. Id. at 319 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted).
22. The language immediately following the holding suggests that
the "consonant with use" limitation is a standard of interference by
which the conduct in question is to be judged. It discusses interference
with the use to which the owner has put the property and with the nor-
mal use by the public. See 391 U.S. at 320-21. The Court, however,
specifically reserved the question of a case where picketing would not
be "directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping
center property was being put." Id. at 320, n.9. And later, only busi-
ness-related illustrations are used in assessing the potential impact of
the decision: Justice Marshall referred specifically to "the substan-
tial consequences for workers seeking to challenge substandard working
conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise,
and minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies". Id.
at 324.
23. 407 U.S. at 561.
24. And so "where private interests were substituting for and per-
forming the customary functions of government, First Amendment
freedoms could not be denied...." Id at 562.
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"extended Marsh to a shopping center situation ... it did so only
in a context where the First Amendment activity was related to
the shopping center's operations. '2r Thus, the Court held that
Logan's "consonant with use" wording limited the availability
of the center to those expressive activities related to the use to
which the property was put.26 In short, the Court found no
dedication of the center to public use, pointing out that the scope
of the invitation to the public was limited to potential shoppers.2 7
In reaching this conclusion the Court expressed concern about
the difficulty of applying the public use standard28 and also
25. Id.
26. The Court said that it would be incorrect to rely on the dicta
in Logan to argue that "whenever a privately owned business district
serves the public generally its sidewalks and streets become the func-
tional equivalents of similar public facilities." Id. (footnote omitted).
In this context, it is interesting to note the development in California
of this area of law. The California Supreme Court had reached the
same result as Logan Valley four years earlier, largely by use of a bal-
ancing technique, although in weighing the interest of the shopping
center owner it noted that he had "fully opened his property to the
public." Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery
Workers' Union, Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 394 P.2d 921, 924, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 236 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965). In a later case
involving the distribution of anti-war leaflets in a privately owned
railroad terminal, the court said that, since the railroads seek neither
privacy nor exclusive possession of their terminal, they are not entitled
to exclude first amendment activities. Furthermore, the appropriate-
ness of the terminal for such activities is determined not by whether
they are related to the use to which the terminal is put but whether
they interfere with that use. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d
353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967). The holding in Logan Valley was added to
this line of thought and extended to cover an area perhaps less open to
the general public (the privately owned sidewalk of a large supermar-
ket). In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
In a subsequent case, it was held that, in addition to the demands of the
first amendment, the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against arbi-
trary discrimination may also apply to a shopping center which has
"undertaken the public function of providing society with the necessi-
ties of life and has become the modern suburban counterpart of the
town center." In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216, n.11, 474 P.2d 992, 999,
n.11, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31, n.11 (1970). Finally in a decision relying on
Logan Valley and the prior California cases, it was held that the covered
mall area of a shopping center was open to communicative activities un-
related to the business use of the center. Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d
653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J. favored the granting of certiorari)
(plaintiffs had sought to gather signatures for two anti-pollution peti-
tions).
27. The Court said, "There is no open-ended invitation to the pub-
lic to use the Center for any and all purposes, however incompatible
with the interests of both the stores and the shoppers whom they serve."
407 U.S. at 565.
28. The Court observed that the public use argument might be
applied to most stores and businesses and that the difference is only
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about the need to consider property rights.2
In discussing the question of an alternate forum, the Court
distinguished Logan on the basis of the apparent unavailability
of such a forum for petitioners in that case. Because the mes-
sage of the labor picketers in Logan was directed at a specific
audience which could only be reached in the vicinity of the store,
there were "no other reasonable opportunities" for communica-
tion.30 The Court contrasted this with respondents' handbilling
in Lloyd which it said could have been effective in any public area
of the city, including the public streets and sidewalks on the ex-
terior of the mall.
Although it may appear that the Lloyd majority has fash-
ioned a more workable standard by relying in a "related to use"
test rather than the more vague notion of public use, its rather
brief discussion fails to fully consider the issues before it. Per-
haps most striking is the majority's complete failure to discuss
the possibility of finding state action through the more conven-
tional method of state involvement, despite the existence of sev-
eral facts upon which such a finding could have been based.31
For example, the city of Portland vacated some eight acres of
public streets to further the development of Lloyd Center as a
"general retail business district" and indicated that it recog-
nized a need for the city "to build new streets and to take other
steps to control the traffic flow that the Center would engen-
der. '32 The Court ignored the apparent similarity to racial dis-
one of degree. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line
between them, and it would be unacceptable to apply the strictures of
the first amendment to all. Id. at 565-66, 569.
29. Id. at 570.
30. Id. at 563.
31. While the dissent mentioned the extent of the city's involve-
ment, it did so only in the attempt to bolster its argument that Lloyd
Center fit the public business district standard of Marsh more closely
than did Logan Valley Plaza. Id. at 576-77. In that connection it also
indicated that the center itself was interlaced with public streets and
sidewalks and that the City of Portland had delegated "full police
power" to its private police. It noted that such a delegation of
police power was one basis for the holding in Marsh that was not
present in Logan. Id. at 575.
In contrast to the majority, the district court in Lloyd held that the
use of the authority which had been granted to Lloyd's private guards
by the state constituted state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing two
cases which held that private detectives were acting under color of state
law. 308 F. Supp. at 131. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97
(1951); De Carlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (WD. Pa. 1966).
32. 407 U.S. at 576 (emphasis in original) concerning ordinances
passed by the city of Portland relative to Lloyd Center in 1954 and 1958.
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crimination cases in which it has found state action on the basis
that the property involved was transferred by the state to a pri-
vate owner 33 or where the state was viewed as "a joint partici-
pant in the challenged activity13 4 due to the expenditure of
public funds.
Furthermore, the majority's consideration of the public use
issue is not entirely satisfying. Despite evident displeasure with
the public use doctrine as extended in Logan, it failed to over-
rule that case and therefore did not specifically renounce the
doctrine. Moreover, while the Court mentioned the difficulty of
drawing a line somewhere on the continuum between a single
shop and a large modem shopping center, it overlooked elements
which could have provided a means for distinguishing Lloyd's
operations from those of ordinary stores or shopping strips. For
example, Lloyd had allowed its premises to be used for political
campaign speeches and Veterans' Day activities, as well as by
the Scouts and the Cancer Society, and had made the mall avail-
able for the solicitations of the American Legion and the Volun-
teers of America.35 Many of these activities are exactly the kind
traditionally associated with public areas. It can be argued that
33. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (transfer of a municipal
park). Nor may a state relieve itself of responsibility by appointing
independent trustees to manage something previously under its control.
Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (relating to Girard
College).
34. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
While the role of the city in Evans and of the state in Girard College
might be distinguished from that of Portland by characterizing the for-
mer as deliberate attempts to avoid state action, that argument would
not be available in regard to Burton where the state leased space to a
private restaurant which discriminated. Evans and Burton have also
been cited as authority for finding state action in the context of the first
amendment. See, e.g., In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216 n.ll, 474 P.2d 992,
999 n.11, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 n.11 (1970).
Another example involving free expression in which such reason-
ing predominated is Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
There plaintiffs were held entitled to access to the grounds of the New
York World's Fair to picket and distribute handbills protesting racial in-justice where the court found the following elements of state involve-
ment: a state law setting up a fair commission, tax exemptions, a special
rent-free lease with New York City, expenditures by several govern-
ment units on exhibits, accelerated highway construction, and a statute
making fair guards "peace officers." The court said that when the state
leases or sells property to someone who then performs services of a
kind that the state "could render or has rendered" (referring in that
case to educational services), the proscriptions of the fourteenth amend-
ment must apply. In fact the "crucial test of state action is . . . 'the
actuality of state involvement rather than the form of the transaction.'"
Id. at 159-60.
35. 407 U.S. at 555, 579.
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the extent to which property has been opened for such use rather
than the owner's motivation in permitting the activity should be
the controlling factor. 36
Although the majority established a "related to use" require-
ment37 that is probably easier to define than are the requisite
36. Such an argument was successful in the California cases cited
in note 26 supra. A policy argument which may be advanced in opposi-
tion to this line of thought is that it would work to the disadvantage
of the public by discouraging private property owners from making
their facilities available to community groups.
Use of the facilities by outside groups is one of several factors
which the Second Circuit has used in determining whether a place is
appropriate for first amendment activity. Wolin v. Port of New York
Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
The court in Wolin upheld the right to distribute anti-war leaflets in
the Authority's terminal. Although the title to the property was in a
separate corporation rather than the state, it had been created by New
York and New Jersey and was subject to statutory regulation. The
court said that this plus the involvement in the public function of
transportation would be sufficient to constitute state action if it were a
case of discrimination under the fourteenth amendment, but:
[W]here the issue involves the exercise of First Amendment
rights in a place clearly available to the general public, the in-
quiry must go further: does the character of the place, the pat-
tern of usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the
population who take advantage of the general invitation ex-
tended make it an appropriate place for communication of views
on issues of political and social significance.
Id. at 89. The terminal was found to be dedicated to public use because
it was used by thousands each day, because it contained shops and
restaurants open to the general public, and because it had its own
police force which could enforce state law. In applying its factors for
the appropriate place test, the court found communicative activities
would not interfere with the normal use of the facility which was char-
acterized by noise and a certain amount of disorder. Furthermore, pre-
vious authorization for use by charity solicitors, glee clubs and auto-
mobile exhibitors demonstrated "the ease with which the Terminal ac-
commodates different forms of communication." Id. at 90.
37. The many cases involving the protection of the distribution of
religious pamphlets, for example, make it clear that there has never
been a general first amendment requirement that the message to be
communicated relate to the activities of the locale. See, e.g., Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The purpose or use to which the
state-owned property is put is relevant insofar as expressive activity
would not be permitted if it would interfere with this "lawfully dedi-
cated" use. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). The appearance
of the 'related to use" standard in cases involving private and quasi-
public property suggests that it is connected there to the scope of the
owner's invitation to the public.
According to the Second Circuit, a relation between the expressive
activity and the forum may be found in two ways: when the place
"represents the object of the protest" or when "the place is where the
relevant audience may be found." Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,
392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968). However, Wolin may perhaps be distin-
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elements for a finding of public use, this standard can be am-
biguous, and was perhaps incorrectly applied in this case. The
majority implies that the "related to use" test refers to business
use, but it neither specifically so states, nor does it respond to the
dissent's argument that respondents' activity was directly related
to the use to which the center was put on Veterans' Day and by
presidential candidates and by the American Legion.8 8 Funda-
mental fairness would seem to dictate that access not be denied
to respondents when others were allowed to use the premises for
public expression, although it may be argued that the center
should only be required to provide a comparable period of ac-
cess.39
If in fact "related to use" is intended to encompass only
business use, it remains to be seen how it will be applied in dif-
ferent fact situations. If outside groups are allowed to use private
property in order to promote sales, then the activities of these
groups are arguably related to business use, and other commu-
nicants might attempt to justify their right to the forum by es-
tablishing a connection between their message and the activities
of the favored groups. It might appear from the Court's own
analysis that distribution of handbills would not have been pro-
hibited if they had been directed at the center's policy of allow-
guished from Lloyd on the basis that in Wolin the communicants (i.e.
traveling servicemen) were especially interested in reaching an audience
likely to be found in the terminal.
38. 407 U.S. at 579.
39. Even-handed enforcement is a prime consideration in first
amendment cases. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 558 (1965). Such reasoning was applied by the California court to
a shopping center context in In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90
Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970). In holding that a shopping center may not consti-
tutionally exclude persons on the basis of long hair or unconventional
clothing, the court said, "those who perform a significant public function
may not erect barriers of arbitrary discrimination in the marketplace."
3 Cal. 3d at 218, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32. Moreover, the
arbitrary power to decide who can exercise first amendment rights in
a particular location has been seen as a major element in finding a dedi-
cation to public use. See Gould, Quasi Public Property, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 505, 528 (1965).
Nevertheless, if Lloyd has allowed the American Legion to use the
center for one day, for example, it may be argued that fairness would
only require that the center be open for handbill distribution for a
comparable period of time. This would protect the owner from being
required to open his property to an indefinite number of groups.
However, an interference test could also protect the owner's interest by




ing the American Legion to solicit even though they also made
reference to the Legion's position on the draft and the war. Un-
der a broad interpretation of business use, it might be argued that
picketing in protest of corporate policies relating to racial injus-
tice or defense contracts would be permissible if the corporation
or its subdivision were doing business in the center, although this
would represent an extension of the apparent scope of Logan.40
In addition to discussing the "related to use" test, the Court
implied that an additional element necessary to bring a case suc-
cessfully under the Logan precedent is the absence of an alter-
nate forum. Since it had already determined that there was no
general dedication to public use and that respondents' message
was not related to the use to which the property was put, it is not
clear why the majority felt it necessary to go on to consider the
question of an alternate forum. Arguably, availability of an al-
ternate forum may be a factor which will grow in importance to
the extent that the related to use question is evenly balanced.
It is also unclear whether the alternate forum test is a part of
the Court's holding or merely an additional means of distinguish-
ing Logan. Since the question of an alternate forum was not
integral to the holding in Logan but appeared in the form of a
superfluous argument,41 Lloyd has introduced a new test if this
requirement of alternate forum unavailability is to be read as
part of its holding. The two tests may be logically interrelated
since arguably if the message is related to the use of the property,
no other forum can be adequate for effective communication.
However, if the implication is that there can be no adequate alter-
native when the message is related to the use of the property, it
would appear that the availability of an alternate forum is going
to decide the public use question and that it is up to the protestor
to justify his right of access by showing the relation of his mes-
sage to the forum. This result would be unfortunate both concep-
tually and from the standpoint of public policy.
Since there has been no general requirement in first amend-
40. See note 22 supra.
41. The consideration of an alternate forum in Logan arose only in
response to respondent's contention that his injunction amounted to a
lawful regulation of expressive activity rather than a suppression of it
The Court accepted arguendo his characterization of "the requirement
that picketing be carried on outside" the center as only a regulation.
391 U.S. at 321. It concluded, however, that even if the injunction
could be characterized as a regulation, it was an impermissible one, at
least partly because of the inadequacy of the petitioners' opportunity
for effective communication in the area along the public road.
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ment cases to show the lack of an alternate forum in order to gain
access to property for expressive activities,42 there is no clear
definition of this concept and none was formulated in Lloyd.
It would appear, however, that forum adequacy should depend
on whether the communication reaches the audience the speaker
intends to address. The Lloyd Court, on the other hand, ap-
peared to take the position that the communicant is entitled to
reach only the general public with his message, even though
some courts have gone so far as to say that the communicant is
entitled to choose a convenient forum or one in keeping with his
means.43 It would seem that the broader view of an adequate
forum would better serve the public interest in the free dissemi-
nation of ideas.
Even under the restrictive view of an adequate alternate
forum adopted in Lloyd, the Court recognized the need of com-
municants for "other reasonable opportunities to convey their
message to their intended audience" 44 but failed to ascertain un-
der this standard whether the forum was adequate. The ma-
jority suggested that the availability of public streets and side-
walks exterior to the mall complex furnished an alternate location
for respondents' distribution. The Court 'distinguished the situa-
tion in Logan where access to the vicinity of the store was needed
42. In fact the Court has said that "one is not to have the exercise
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
43. The California Supreme Court has recognized that persons may
have a significant interest in a particular forum even when an alter-
nate is available:
Access to the thousands of persons who congregate on foot
daily at the Center is a highly significant vehicle for the dis-
semination of ideas .... The Inland Center serves as the
primary business district for a large surrounding community
and is the most effective and desirable location for the conduct
of plaintiffs' First Amendment activities.
Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 662, 477 P.2d 733, 738, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501,
506 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). It is up to the communicant
to choose the forum, and the appropriateness should be determined by
weighing the conflicting interests rather than by the availability of an
alternate forum. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 852 n.7, 434 P.2d 353,
357 n.7 (1967).
The Lloyd dissent expressed concern for those without access to the
media and feared that "[o]nly the wealthy may find effective com-
munication possible" if the Court no longer upholds the public use
concept. 407 U.S. at 586. The only way in which those who are not
wealthy "can express themselves to a broad range of citizens on is-
sues of general public concern" is if they are permitted to utilize "those
areas in which most of their fellow citizens can be found." Id. at 580-81.
44. 407 U.S. at 563.
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in order to reach a particular audience and to prevent undue
hazard to the communicants.45 But it may also be argued that
the respondents in Lloyd had the same need. 4 0 Since other
groups had used the forum for expressive activity, respondents
could have been seen to have a strong interest in reaching the
same audience, and since there were some parking facilities lo-
cated in the mall complex itself, some visitors would have no oc-
casion to use the surrounding public sidewalks. Not only was
the mall the place at which the greatest number of people could
be easily reached, but it was also probably the place at which the
communication would be most effective.4 7 While the majority
dismissed the possibility of hazard by suggesting that respond-
ents station themselves at stop signs, this arguably would still
place them in considerably more danger than is desirable. Fur-
thermore, the proposal is of questionable effectiveness since
drivers moving in traffic are unlikely to be as receptive to hand-
bills as pedestrians. 48
In arriving at its holding in Lloyd the majority abandoned
the balancing technique of March and Logan despite its use of the
term "accommodation" of rights and values. 49 The Court
simply stated that petitioner's property rights would have been
infringed by the handbill distribution despite a failure to show
actual interference with shopping center operations. This is in
sharp contrast to the dissent's emphasis on balancing.5" There is
45. Id. at 566 n.12.
46. The dissent pointed out that the district court found that the
mall was the only place where respondents had reasonable access to
all of Lloyd Center's patrons, and suggested that the majority had ex-
ceeded "even the most expansive view of the proper appellate function"
by overturning the lower court's finding of fact. 407 U.S. at 583-84 n.7.
47. Since access to most stores was from the mall only, almost all
visitors would pass through it. The landscaping and benches in the
central mall might be expected to have attracted those who came
to shop or to use the auditorium or skating rink to pause in the area,
making them perhaps more receptive to communicative efforts than in
other situations.
48. The difficulty of approaching drivers is discussed in the dis-
sent. Id. at 584 n.7.
49. Id. at 567, 570.
50. The dissent said:
We must remember that it is a balance that we are strikin--a
balance between the freedom to speak, a freedom that is given
a preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and the freedom
of a private property owner to control his property. When the
competing interests are fairly weighted, the balance can only
be struck in favor of speech.
Id. at 580. It concluded that respondents' interest in effective communi-
cation must outweigh the owner's interest in preventing litter or disrup-
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good authority for the view that when important constitutional
rights are involved, a more satisfying result will be obtained by
balancing the interests in each case as opposed to setting out a
hard and fast rule.51 The great advantage of balancing is that it
allvws a court to weigh the particular circumstances of each case.
Not only can the communicant's interest in an effective forum be
weighed against the property interest of the owner, 2 but the in-
dividual's right to access to information 53 and the public's inter-
est in the free exchange of information5 4 can be considered.
One of the basic ingredients in first amendment balancing is
an "interference with normal use" standard." Under such a test
tion, especially since it failed to see any evidence of interference with
"the motivation of customers to buy." Id. at 581-82.
51. See, e.g., cases cited note 7 supra. For an application of the
balancing test in a shopping center case involving public expression
on private property, see Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733,
91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), and discussion
in note 26 supra.
In Diamond, the court observed that the communicant's interest in
effective communication must be balanced against the property rights
of the owner which have become "largely theoretical" and "diluted"
because of the public character of the center. Id. at 662, 477 P.2d at 739,
91 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
52. Too great an interference with the owner's interest could con-
stitute a "taking" under the fifth amendment as Justice Powell indi-
cated in Lloyd. 407 U.S. at 567. However, an examination of the
development of the law regarding what constitutes a taking would indi-
cate that private property rights may be considerably impaired by the
institution of zoning laws, for example, without it amounting to a taking.
See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Nuisance
law also may permit restrictions on private property when there is an
interference with the rights of others.
53. The policy underlying the holding in Marsh was to give per-
sons who happen to live in company towns the same right to unre-
stricted access to information as any other citizens. 326 U.S. at 508-09.
The right of the individual to receive information was also emphasized
in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
54. The public interest in the free exchange of information has
been said to be essential to the functioning of our democracy. See, e.g.,
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 507; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 95;
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). In this light it has
been said that if the place is appropriate for any communicative activi-
ties, it would be "an anomalous inversion of our fundamental values" to
deny access to political communication. Wolin v. Port of New York
Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
A further public policy argument favoring liberal application of
the first amendment is that resort to violence is prevented by permit-
ting expressive activities. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 56
(1966) (dissenting opinion).
55. It may be necessary to prohibit expression if it would interfere
with the "general comfort and convenience" or "peace and good order."
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). As to interference with traffic flow or
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the Lloyd facts should lead to a different result.50  If the dis-
tributiun were orderly and nondisruptive and no actual damage
to business could be shown, respondents' interests should out-
weigh the "naked title" of petitioners.57 Moreover, it would be
possible to protect the owner's interest without imposing an ab-
solute ban on the expressive activity.5 8
highway safety, see, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
Other first amendment cases suggest that expression may be al-
lowed up to the point that it becomes disruptive or coercive. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Using this
rationale it would not appear that the interests of the visitors to Lloyd
Center have been harmed since the distribution was peaceful and orderly
with no apparent coercive effect. (The district court made a finding of
fact that the distribution was "quiet, orderly, and did not interfere with
the Mall selling activities, and there was no littering." 308 F. Supp.
at 130. The Supreme Court noted that there had been a complaint from
one customer but did not discuss the finding of no interference. 407
U.S. at 556.) Even under a stricter standard it is unlikely that the
shoppers' interest in not being disturbed would be materially affected
by a leaflet distribution. The interest in privacy cannot be given the
same protection in a public setting as in a residential one. See, e.g.,
Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.
2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1949).
The distribution of handbills approaches pure speech and, therefore,
would be more justifiably entitled to protection than if respondents
had been engaging in guerilla theater or a demonstration. See Jamison
v. State, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943), where the Court said that the constitu-
tional right of free expression extends to "the communication of ideas
by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word." See, e.g.,
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
56. The choice of standard can also affect the outcome by altering
the burden of proof. Under the "related to use" standard, the burden
would presumably be on the communicant to show that his message
was related to the center's operations whereas an interference standard
would require the owner to prove actual interference with his opera-
tions. It has been suggested, however, that an interference with normal
use standard would also be inadequate to protect the communicant's in-
terest unless the property owner is required to show the availability of
an adequate alternate forum. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81
HARv. L. R1Ev. 69, 138-41 (1967). The necessity to consider a variety of
factors regardless of the standard used would support the view that
balancing is the most suitable technique.
57. In Logan the Court said that in the absence of any showing of
significant interference "with the use to which the mall property was
being put,.. . [n]aked title is essentially all that is at issue." 391 U.S.
at 324. This terminology is similar to the "bare title" of Diamond, 3
Cal. 3d at 667, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509, and the "property
right worn thin by public usage" in Schwartz-Torrance, 61 Cal. 2d at
775, 394 P.2d at 926, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
58. The interests of the owners and of visitors alike could be con-
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Lloyd has several possible implications for the future course
of state action theory and the first amendment area. By restrict-
ing the public use concept"9 Lloyd may have the effect of en-
couraging an attempt to develop the public function doctrine in
its place. There is language in Marsh which suggests that the real
basis of the public use concept is the delegation by the state of
a public function. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,1 decided
on the same day as Lloyd, the Court indicated that the determina-
tive factor may be the degree to which private property has as-
sumed the "functional attributes of public property devoted to
public use."'6 2 Arguably the public function doctrine is a more
precise analytic tool because it would facilitate line drawing6 " and
ceivably safeguarded by rules which would reasonably regulate the
number of persons who could engage in the first amendment activity
and the area and manner in which the rights could be exercised. See,
e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943), where the Court said
that the possible danger involved in door to door distribution could be
easily controlled so that "stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but
that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dis-
semination of ideas."
An argument somewhat similar to that advanced in Martin was
raised by the Lloyd petitioners in the district court where they at-
tempted to justify their exclusion of respondents on the ground that the
distribution violated the Selective Service laws; the court suggested
that, if this allegation was proved, Lloyd's remedy would lie in "arrest
and prosecution in the normal course" rather than in the "prohibition
of all speech." 308 F. Supp. at 133. The dissent indicates that this ar-
gument was subsequently abandoned. 407 U.S. at 584.
59. The majority would apply it only to an area with all the char-
acteristics of a town. 407 U.S. at 562-63. The dissent argued that the
controlling factor is whether the property serves as the public business
district. Id. at 576.
The rejection of a broad reading of Logan may foreclose any fur-
ther application of the public use concept to commercial property.
However, it is not clear that the limited invitation approach can be
applied to the quasi-public kind of property involved in Wolin and in
In re Hoffman.
60. See notes 15-18 supra, and accompanying text.
61. 407 U.S. 539 (1972). In Central Hardware, the Court refused to
apply Logan to allow nonemployee union picketing in parking lots adja-
cent to two hardware stores. Both the majority and the dissent indi-
cated that the case should have been decided under NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 407 U.S. at 548. The constitutional
issue might have been avoided by relying on Babcock which laid out
guidelines for the accommodation of property rights and labor organiza-
tion rights under the National Labor Relations Act.
62. Id. at 547.
63. While it is clear that public use could not extend to the interior
hallways of an apartment house in which the right to privacy will pre-
vail (Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1949) ), it
is uncertain if it could have been extended to the interior of a large
department store, for example. Public use is an imprecise standard
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make it easier to understand why constitutional restraints might
be imposed on the owner of private property. Lloyd might also
be seen as rejecting some of the state action theory developed in
racial discrimination cases, but the better view would seem to be
that the Court did not speak to that area at all since it com-
pletely ignored the potential issue of direct state involvement
It remains to be seen whether the Court will also apply the
tests used in Lloyd when dealing with free expression cases in-
volving state-owned property. Since the "related to use" re-
quirement is linked with the scope of the invitation to the pub-
lic, it clearly could not be imposed on all public property, but
could be used in cases similar to Adderley v. Florida64 where a
special kind of property is involved. In Adderley demonstrators
were denied the right to use the jailhouse grounds to protest cer-
tain arrests and racial segregation in the jail because of a possible
interference with normal use. The Lloyd test could lead to a dif-
ferent result since the message was related to the use to which
the property was put.65 The alternate forum test, on the other
hand, could have the effect of drastically limiting the areas
although it has been said to have the advantage of speaking to the in-
terest to be protected. See Note, B.U.L. RPv. 699, 704-05 (1968).
The reason that the public function standard might be easier to
apply is that there have traditionally been certain functions which have
been regarded as peculiarly associated with the state. It has been sug-
gested that any displacement of the state in the performance of such
functions might constitute state action. See The Supreme Court 1967
Term, supra note 13, at 133. In the shopping center context this might
be seen as the displacement of the municipal business center including
the municipal market and town square or gathering place, as well as
maintenance of streets and sidewalks and the provision of police pro-
tection and possibly also of water and lighting. This line of thought has
been criticized, however, as possibly leading to "an enormous expan-
sion of the concept of state action" requiring the "examination of the
social and economic role in the community of the entity whose action
was challenged." Id. at 134.
Statistical data were made available in Logan relative to the grow-
ing number and importance of large shopping centers. 391 U.S. at 324.
The 1966 data could not, however, reflect significant recent develop-
ments in the nature and role of shopping centers. Since no mention
was made in Lloyd of such data, one may presume none were offered
by the parties. However, the dissent predicts that cities might find it
to their financial advantage increasingly to rely on private business to
perform functions once governmental in nature. 407 U.S. at 585-86.
The effect would be to reduce the number of potential forums for ex-
pressive activity unless there were a concomitant carryover of the
first amendment.
64. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
65. However, it may be argued that the courthouse grounds, for
example, would have provided an adequate alternate forum, in which
case the result would be the same.
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
available for public expression if it were carried over into first
amendment cases generally. 6
The long tradition in first amendment cases of balancing the
interests involved would indicate that the balancing technique is
likely to survive even though not employed in Lloyd. It is espe-
cially likely to be used in situations where the "related to use"
and "alternate forum" tests are more difficult to apply. Never-
theless, the substance and tone of the Lloyd opinion suggest that
the current Court will give greater weight to property rights in
general than has been seen in recent years, regardless of the
test applied.
66. Since this test has not been generally used in determining
whether free expression could be exercised on public property, its ap-
plication in such cases would place another obstacle in the path of the
communicant.
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Constitutional Law: State Action: UCC Self-Help
Repossession Provisions (§§ 9-503, 9-504) Violate
Due Process Requirements
In two cases consolidated for trial plaintiffs executed se-
curity agreements in favor of defendant lenders to cover the pur-
chase price of motor vehicles. In Adams v. Egley the agreement
provided for the right of the creditor to take possession of the ve-
hicle under the California Commercial Code "or other applicable
law" in the event of default. In the companion case, Posadas v.
Star & Crescent Federal Credit Union, the agreement provided
for repossession "according to law." In both cases plaintiffs failed
to make payments and defendants repossessed the vehicles
through collection agencies. Plaintiffs brought suit against both
the lenders and the collection agencies, asserting that California
Commercial Code sections 9503 and 9504 (UCC sections 9-503 and
9-504) 1 violate due process of law in providing for repossession
and disposition of collateral by a secured party without prior
notice and hearing.2 The issues were presented for decision on
motion for partial summary judgment. The District Court held
that California's passage of sections 9503 and 9504 provided the
requisite state action to confer federal jurisdiction, and that the
procedures allowed amounted to a taking of property without
due process of law. The court further held that plaintiffs had
not effectively waived their constitutional rights by signing the
security agreement since the creditors had complete control over
the terms of the contract. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972). 3
1. CAL. CoivM. CODE § 9503 (West 1964) provides in part: "In
taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process
if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by ac-
tion." Section 9504 allows sale of the repossessed property by the cred-
itor. Section 9503 is identical to UCC § 9-503. Section 9504 does not
differ from UCC § 9-504 in any aspect relevant to this case. Citations
herein will be made to the pertinent California provisions.
2. Plaintiffs alleged federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and under the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. Section 1331(a) confers jurisdiction on the district courts over
any civil action which "arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States." Section 1343(3) provides that the district courts
have jurisdiction over any civil action "[t]o redress the deprivation,
under color of any state law ...of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States .... "
3. Appeal docketed, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir., Feb. 29, 1972. As an
incidental matter, the court held that the security agreement gave the
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I.
The court first concluded that in order to establish jurisdic-
tion it was necessary to find some significant state involvement
in defendants' activities.4 It stated that "the conduct of private
individuals, however wrongful or discriminatory, does not come
within the purview of those sections if the state has in no way
authorized, sanctioned, or encouraged it." 5
During the Warren Court years, the Supreme Court broad-
ened the scope of federal question jurisdiction by expanding the
definition of state action. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority,6 a restaurant which leased space in a parking facility
owned by a state agency had discriminated against blacks. State
action was found even though the state had done nothing to en-
courage the wrongful action by its tenant other than enter into
the lease with him. A similarly broad definition of state action
was employed in Lombard v. Louisiana,7 which involved trespass
convictions secured by the operator of a private restaurant. An-
nouncements by city officials opposing the integration of private
restaurants were there held sufficient state action for federal
jurisdiction.8 In Reitman v. Mulkey 9 an amendment to the Cali-
fornia State Constitution which prohibited the state from placing
restrictions on an individual's right to sell real property to whom-
ever he chose was held unconstitutional. Prior to the amend-
ment, the legislature had enacted several laws which proscribed
discrimination in real estate sales. The Court found that, in
creditor no interest in items found in the vehicle at the time of repos-
session. "[A]s to these, the denial of due process is self-evident." 338
F. Supp. at 621.
4. At the time of the Adams decision, it was generally held that
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) conferred jurisdiction when personal rights were in
issue but not when only property rights were involved. See Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939) (concurring opinion). The Adams court
referred to this distinction, 338 F. Supp. at 617 n.2, but determined that
it was not necessary to decide the issue. Since that time, Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) has removed the distinction
and affords property rights the same protection as formerly attached to
personal rights under § 1343 (3).
5. 338 F. Supp. at 617.
6. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
7. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
8. See also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (statute empower-
ing a political party to prescribe the qualifications of its members was
sufficient state involvement for jurisdiction when the party used that
power to prevent blacks from voting in primary elections); and 28
U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1962), n.27 (insufficient complaints) and n.28 (sufficient
complaints).
9. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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overturning prior law, the amendment had incorporated the right
to discriminate into the state's constitution. Despite the fact that
the discrimination would be performed entirely by private in-
dividuals, the provision was found to have produced a state in-
volvement in private racial discrimination through encouraging
discriminatory practices. The Reitman Court specifically
avoided the creation of any test to determine when state involve-
ment exists, holding that it can be found "'[o] nly by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances' on a case-by-case basis ... ."1o This
formulation was later applied by the Supreme Court in Evans v.
Abney." There a private citizen had willed property for a park
to a city on the condition that its use be restricted to whites. The
fact that state law at the time permitted such a restriction was
held not to be state action:
Nor is there any indication that Senator Bacon in drawing up
his will was persuaded or induced to include racial restrictions
by the fact that such restrictions were permitted by the Georgia
trust statutes.12
The Adams court relied heavily on Reitman, while distin-
guishing Evans, in finding state action. While the Evans Court
found a clear lack of influence from the statute involved, the
Adams court concluded on the basis of reference to the UCC and
to repossession according to law in the security agreements that
the creditors "were 'persuaded or induced to include' reposses-
sion by the fact that such repossession was permitted by stat-
ute."'13 Having shown a causal connection between the statute
and the private conduct, the court concluded that Reitman was
applicable and supported a finding of jurisdiction.
The court's finding of state action and a causal relationship
is subject to criticism on three grounds. First, it is generally
accepted that the statutes which authorize the use of self-help re-
possession are merely enactments of widely followed common
law.1 4 Since the common law procedure did not require the in-
tervention of the state's powers, no state action existed prior to
the statutory enactment. Since the statutes made no change in
the procedures, arguably no new element had been injected upon
10. 387 U.S. at 378 (1967).
11. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
12. Id. at 445.
13. 338 F. Supp. at 617.
14. See, e.g., Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1233, 1243 (1972); CAL. Comm.
CODE § 9501 (West 1964), Comment 2(f) (prior California law); Mnfr.
STAT. Aim. § 336.9-503 (1966), Minnesota Code Comment; Comment, 39
MARQ. L. REv. 246, 254 (1956).
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which a finding of state action could be predicated. 15
Second, it might be contended that the effect of the references
to the UCC is to incorporate only the statutory language into the
terms of the contract. Arguably the creditor holds a right to
repossess based solely on the contract, the enforcement of which is
not contingent upon any statutory enactment. Repossession un-
der this reasoning is thus a totally independent action by the
creditor in which no state involvement exists.10 The court in Ad-
ams noted the decision in Santiago v. McElroy,17 which dealt
with this issue when it considered the constitutionality of Penn-
sylvania distraint procedures. Santiago imposed a restrictive in-
terpretation on the language of the contract to avoid the creation
of an independent right to distrain. It was the view of the court
in Adams that any independent right to repossess was nonethe-
less created under the authority of state law and that the state
of the law influenced the exercise of that right. Thus the court
found it unnecessary to follow the reasoning of Santiago to reach
the same conclusion.
Third, the quantum of state action necessary for a finding of
jurisdiction is arguably greater where property rights rather
than civil rights are involved. In Oller v. Bank of America,' a
case decided three weeks after Adams on an identical set of facts,
the federal district court declined to find state action on the
ground that Reitman extended its broad definition of state action
only to cases involving racial discrimination. The court in Oller
restricted state action in non-racial cases to situations where state
law compels the private action or where the power exercised is
purely of statutory as distinguished from common law or con-
tractual origin. This limitation of an expansive interpretation of
state action to cases involving racial discrimination is question-
15. This analysis prevailed in Green v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank,
348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972), which involved a challenge to the Vir-
ginia version of UCC § 9-503 on facts identical to Adams. The court
held that "passive state action such as is present in the instant case is
not violative of due process. There must be active and direct state ac-
tion." 348 F. Supp. at 675. Cf. Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727
(D. Colo. 1972).
16. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.
1971) upheld the Florida version of UCC § 9-503 on facts indistinguish-
able from Adams on the ground that the independent contract right
made the existence of state involvement irrelevant.
17. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
18. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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able in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,1 9 which struck
down distinctions between rights of the person and property
rights in determining jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3).
However, Lynch did not specifically require that all rights be
subject to the same standards in determining federal jurisdiction.
Further clarification by the Supreme Court on this issue is nec-
essary.
Subsequent to Adams, the Supreme Court has indicated some
outer limits of the definition of state action. In Moose Lodge v.
Irvis,20 a black guest of a club member was refused service at the
club's bar and dining room because of his race. State action was
asserted on the grounds that the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority
had issued a liquor license to the club. The Court held that the
liquor regulations were not so directly related to the discrimina-
tion as to constitute state involvement in the actions of the club.
This was true despite the comprehensive regulation of the club's
liquor sales and the limitation on the number of licenses au-
thorized in any municipality. The basis of the holding was the
conclusion that the liquor regulations did not in any way foster
or encourage the wrongful private conduct. The Court noted
that "[t]here is no suggestion in this record that the Pennsyl-
vania statutes and regulations governing the sale of liquor are
intended either overtly or covertly to encourage discrimina-
tion."' 2 1 The opinion referred to state enforcement of "privately
originated discrimination,"2 2 fostering discrimination, "3 and the
state becoming a partner with the discriminating club, 2 4 all of
which connote a cause-effect relationship. On the other hand, the
Court discussed the significant involvement - 5 and implication of
the state,26 indicating that statutory authorization or sanction
even without a causal relationship might constitute state action.
The Moose Lodge opinion did hold, however, that a regulation
adopted by the State Liquor Control Board27 requiring the
licensee to adhere to all provisions of its constitution and by-
19. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). See note 2 supra.
20. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
21. Id. at 173.
22. Id. at 172.
23. Id. at 176, 177.
24. Id. at 177.
25. Id. at 173.
26. Id. at 177.




laws was sufficient state action to warrant enjoining its enforce-
ment where the club's constitution required discriminatory prac-
tices.28 The fact that the statute was racially neutral on its face
was held irrelevant where the practical effect of the statute was
to enforce discrimination.
The Adams holding that passage of the statutes in question
by the state equals state action seems to lie between the two
holdings of Moose Lodge. Unlike Moose Lodge, where the fact
that the liquor regulations were not addressed to the private dis-
criminatory conduct was crucial in finding that licensing did not
amount to state action, clearly the repossession statutes are di-
rectly related to the private action involved, viz., summary re-
possession. However, the state is merely assuming the passive
role of failing to prevent creditors from using self-help reposses-
sions rather than actively requiring that such methods be used
or assisting in their use, an important factor in the second hold-
ing of Moose Lodge.
The Adams court found a causal connection in the refer-
ences to state law in the contracts. However, the existence of
the common law and independent contractual rights to reposses-
sion render it extremely doubtful that the sections in question
were the motivating force in the preparation of the contract
terms. It is a more reasonable conclusion that the terms would
have been the same had the statutes never been passed. 2 The
apparent requirement of Moose Lodge of a causal connection
between the statute and the proscribed conduct is therefore not
satisfied. If, however, Moose Lodge does not require a causal re-
lationship, sections 9-503 and 9-504, which are directly related to
the private conduct (repossession) and which mandate a given
procedure, may well be found to involve the state significantly
in proscribed private conduct.
28. "Even though the Liquor Control Board regulation in question
is neutral in its terms, the result of its application in a case where the
constitution and bylaws of a club required racial discrimination would
be to invoke the sanctions of the State to enforce a concededly dis-
criminatory private rule." 407 U.S. at 178-79.
29. A holding of state action based on the terms of the contracts
could justify a different result in Adams than in Posadas since the con-
tract in Adams specifically mentioned the code provisions whereas the
Posadas contract referred to repossession according to law. Such a
difference in outcome hardly seems justified considering the otherwise
identical situations of the plaintiffs. Even more important is the fact
that creditors could avoid the holding merely by deleting all references
to the statute law and still provide for pre-judgment summary reposses-
sion in the contracts. The defeat of jurisdiction by this tactic would re-




In finding a violation of due process, the Adams court relied
on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.30 The Wisconsin pre-judg-
ment garnishment procedure there considered permitted a sum-
mons to be issued at the request of the creditor's lawyer,3'
thereby freezing the debtor's wages prior to trial This proce-
dure was held to be a violation of due process in not affording the
debtor notice and hearing prior to garnishment. Some lower
courts have subsequently confined Sniadach strictly to its facts,
holding that it was a unique case "involving a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.132
Other courts have viewed Sniadach as setting forth a general re-
quirement for due process in the field of pre-judgment proceed-
ings.33 At the same time, the Supreme Court has relied upon
Sniadach in extending the requirements of prior notice and
hearing to other statutory procedures affecting various property
interests.3 4
A major portion of Adams was devoted to the analysis of
these divergent lines of cases. However, the Supreme Court has
since put the issue to rest. In Fuentes v. Shevin,35 the Court held
that the analysis which limited Sniadach to its facts was erroneous
and that the case stands for the broader interpretation of the
requirements of due process.30 In Fuentes, Pennsylvania and
Florida replevin statutes3 7 authorizing the issuance of a writ di-
30. 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 54 MnINN. L. Rv. 853 (1970).
31. Sniadach and the cases which have followed it dealt with pre-judgment procedures which utilized a state official in some capacity
during the proceedings. Thus the issue of state action was not before
the court.
32. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir.
1970).
33. For a listing of cases following either view, see Adams v. Egley,
338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare payments); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), noted in 56
MinyN. L. REv. 264 (1971) (suspension of driver's license); Swarb v. Len-
nox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (confession of judgment proceedings).
35. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
36. 'This reading of Sniadach and Goldberg reflects the premise
that those cases marked a radical departure from established principles
of procedural due process. They did not. Both decisions were in the
mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with the ab-
solute 'necessities' of life but establishing that due process requires an
opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes effect."
Id. at 88.
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, .07, .08, .10, & .13 (Supp. 1972); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1968).
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recting the sheriff to seize secured property were challenged.
It was held that due process requires that a debtor be given no-
tice and opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of his
property interest, even though he lacks full title to the goods at
the time of repossession. As with the replevin statutes, the use
of summary repossession under section 9503 results in depriva-
tion of conditionally sold property without an opportunity for
hearing. Further, the replevin procedure, unlike sections 9503
and 9504, at least provides that the debtor be given three days
to redeem the property by posting bond. The presence of the
sheriff in the replevin procedure also gives the debtor protec-
tion not available in summary repossession.
The Court in Fuentes recognized an exception to its holding
where: (1) seizure is necessary to secure an important govern-
mental or general public interest; (2) there is a special need for
prompt action; and (3) the state keeps strict control over the use
of legitimate force.3 8 All three criteria must be met. The facts
of Adams apparently do not satisfy these special circumstances.
While the interest of the creditor in collecting his debt was not
sufficient in Fuentes to satisfy the first criterion, the Court
was there dealing with replevin, a procedure much less widely
used than summary repossession. 39 A correct application of this
first criterion requires that the public interest in preserving the
due process rights of citizens be balanced against the public in-
terest in the collection of -debts. It is of course in the public
interest that the costs of credit be minimized and that credit be
available to a large portion of the population. The additional
cost entailed by the loss of the replevin procedure outlined in
Fuentes will arguably not approach the costs occasioned by the
loss of summary repossession. Hence, Fuentes may not be con-
trolling. The elimination of summary repossession may result in
higher costs to everyone and decreased availability of credit.
However, it is uncertain whether costs and restrictions will
greatly increase after Adams. Even under the present system,
the creditor normally sends informal notices of default before he
resorts to repossession. It is possible that many debtors would
not claim their right to a hearing even after notification that
such a right exists. Also, the increased cost of the prior hearings
must be balanced against the present cost of debtor suits to re-
claim repossessed goods. It should also be noted that, since sec-
38. 407 U.S. at 91.
39. Id. at 92.
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tion 9503 authorizes summary repossesion only if no breach of
the peace is necessary, creditors are often forced to employ judi-
cial process even absent the holding of Adams. On balance, it is
entirely possible that the costs to the public of protecting the
debtor's rights will be minimal compared to the value of the
rights protected.
Clearly, situations exist in which prompt repossession of se-
curity is imperative, especially in the case of automobiles, which
are easily concealed or sold by the debtor.40 However, any sys-
tem that delays repossession not only assists the unscrupulous
debtor in his attempts to evade payment but also protects the
debtor who believes he has a valid defense to the creditor's claim.
Where summary repossession is allowed, the good-faith debtor
loses possession of collateral even though he may prevail at trial.
Depriving an honest individual of his rights in order to prevent
others from dishonestly benefiting from those rights runs con-
trary to notions of justice. This is especially upsetting where
there is no showing that any substantial number of debtors will
abuse the hearing process. If that occurs the courts will be pre-
sented with an issue which perhaps calls for a redefinition of
the procedure. Even if it is shown that situations exist in which
prompt repossession is vital, sections 9503 and 9504 are not "nar-
rowly drawn to meet any such unusual conditions," 41 as required
by the second criterion of Fuentes. Because section 9503 places
the control of the use of summary repossession entirely in the
hands of private persons, the state retains no control so long as
the repossession is peaceable. This abdication of state control
clearly violates the third criterion of the exception to Fuentes.
While Adams requires that the debtor be afforded certain rights
before repossession, the holding of Adams may achieve no net
gain in the protection of these rights. Absent a legislative pro-
hibition, state courts could continue to uphold summary repos-
session, based either on common law or an independent contrac-
tual right, reducing Adams to "ideological tinkering with state
law."4 2
40. The District Judge in Adams voiced reservations as to the de-
sirability of the result which his view of the cases compelled him to
reach. He felt that creditors are more than willing to deal flexibly with
persons making an honest attempt to pay rather than resorting imme-
diately to summary repossession. He feared that his decision would
benefit only those with no desire to pay and to whom the manner of
repossession was irrelevant. 338 F. Supp. at 622.
41. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
42. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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In order to implement the decision and consider all competing
interests, the states should enact statutes providing a right to
notice and hearing prior to repossession and creating inexpensive
procedures whereby the creditor can quickly determine whether
the debtor has grounds for objecting to repossession. The Su-
preme Court has not required that the procedure be a full judi-
cial hearing. Rather, the form of the hearing must be "appro-
priate to the nature of the case."'4 3 A system implementing the
following procedures may meet due process requirements: (1)
notice of -default from creditor to debtor; (2) a short period in
which the debtor may file objection to repossession; and (3) re-
possession if no objection is filed; or (4) hearing before a referee
with powers to stay or order repossession if the debtor contests. ' 4
Absent legislative leadership, the courts will be left to a case-by-
case balancing of interests in attempting to protect honest cred-
itors and debtors from their more unscrupulous counterparts.
Regardless of the form of the legislative solution, its ability to es-
tablish rights with certainty commends it in this situation.
III.
Answering a third issue, the Adams court held that any
purported waiver of constitutional rights is ineffective where
there is an adhesion contract whose provisions are dictated by
the lender. Since Adams, the Supreme Court has had occasion to
comment on the validity of waivers of constitutional rights. In
D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.,'5 the Court upheld the valid-
ity of a cognovit provision waiving rights to a pre-judgment hear-
ing in a contract negotiated between two corporations. The
Court held, however, that "where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal
consequences may ensue."46  Swarb v. Lennox, 47 decided the
same day as Overmeyer, held that in appropriate circumstances it
is possible for a debtor to waive his rights effectively by contract
43. Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
44. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (dissenting opin-
ion) for an analysis of simplified methods of satisfying due process,
suggesting that the debtor gains nothing significant under such pro-
cedures. However, abbreviated procedures would enable the state courts
to cope with the influx of hearings likely to be generated by the
abolition of the self-help procedures.
45. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
46. Id. at 188.
47. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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provisions consenting to the use of Pennsylvania confession of
judgment procedures. However, the decision left standing the
lower court's determination that this waiver is not effective
where the debtor had annual income of less than $10,000.48
Fuentes cited the language of Overmeyer as setting forth the
proper guidelines for weighing the effectiveness of a waiver of
constitutional rights in a contract. 49 Consequently, it seems al-
most certain that a security agreement granting the creditor the
right to summary repossession as part of the standardized form
contract, as in Adams, would be held by the Supreme Court to be
ineffective as a waiver of the debtor's constitutional rights to
prior notice and hearing.
Finance companies could possibly modify their form con-
tracts to provide for a sufficient waiver of the debtor's rights.
Overmeyer applied the same standards to waiver of rights in a
contract as are used in a criminal proceeding-the waiver must
be voluntary, intelligent, and knowingly made. 0 It might be
possible to reflect such a waiver through appropriately drawn and
highlighted language of a security agreement. However, the wide
disparity in the bargaining power of the parties may lead a court
to conclude that such a waiver is ineffective regardless of the
clarity of the contract language.r1
IV.
The courts presently appear to have embarked on an expan-
sion of the due process rights which are guaranteed an individual
prior to deprivation of any significant property interest. A cred-
itor's best hope of avoiding the result in Adams in future litiga-
tion is to attack federal jurisdiction on grounds of lack of state
action. Once jurisdiction is recognized, Fuentes compels the con-
clusion that a summary repossession violates due process and it
is unlikely that an effective waiver of rights will exist in the
ordinary circumstances.
48. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
49. 407 U.S. at 95. In Fuentes, since the language of the specific
contracts involved did not purport to be a waiver, it was unnecessary
for the court to weigh its effectiveness.
50. 405 U.S. at 187.
51. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), suggests that such
waivers may be per se ineffective where the debtor falls below an ap-
propriate income level. The lower court had set this level at $10,000 per
year.
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Environmental Control: Environmental Impact
Statements Must Include Discussion of Alternatives
Beyond Scope of Authority of Reporting Body
Defendant Secretary of the Interior proposed to sell oil and
natural gas leases of some 80 tracts of submerged land in the Gulf
of Mexico.' The Interior Department issued an environmental
impact statement which, as required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) ,2 disclosed adverse environmental ef-
fects of the plan and listed alternative methods of procuring the
needed energy. Prior to the opening of sealed bids, plaintiff en-
vironmental organization sought a preliminary injunction against
the sale on the ground that the defendant's discussion of alterna-
tives did not satisfy the NEPA requirement since the alterna-
tives were discussed very superficially, the consequences of each
were not considered, and some alternatives were omitted alto-
gether. The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia granted the injunction.3 The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the environmental impact statement required by
NEPA must consider the consequences of all alternatives cur-
rently practical in sufficient detail to make a reasoned choice
possible. Analysis of alternatives must include those which the
reviewing agency lacks the power to bring about, such as solu-
tions requiring legislative and executive action. Further, the
court impliedly held that NEPA requires a re-examination of
previous legislative and executive policies whenever govern-
mental action might result in significant environmental effects.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827(D.C. Cir. 1972) .4
NEPA is the first effort by the federal government to ensure
that the environmental consequences of all federal actions are
1. The sale was authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970).
3. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F.
Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
4. The scope of appellate review in Morton was broader than is
typical on a motion for summary reversal, the court ruling on the mer-
its to the extent that they were ripe for decision. The issues presented
were primarily legal, and the court noted: "[tihe present case is one
of public moment, where expedition should be provided if possible."
458 F.2d at 832. See Meccano, Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141
(1920); A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
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thoroughly considered in the administrative process.5 NEPA re-
quires all federal agencies to issue a "detailed statement" on the
environmental impact of all "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human enviromnent."0  The state-
ment must evaluate a proposed action in terms of environmental
impact, unavoidable adverse effects, alternatives, short-term uses
vs. long-term productivity, and irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources.7 In addition it has been established
that NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. Morton ex-
tends the requirement of full disclosure to the discussion of al-
ternatives8
Although several cases have considered whether a NEPA en-
vironmental impact statement is required,9 the general require-
5. Calvert Cliffs Co-ordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
7. Id. In addition the statute requires that the responsible official
must consult with and obtain comments from any federal agency with
either legal jurisdiction or special expertise with respect to the environ-
mental impact involved. Id.
8. The point was first made by Judge Eisele in Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Corps of Engineers. "At the very least, NEPA is an envi-
ronmental full disclosure law." 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Calvert Cliffs Co-ordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 3 E.R.C. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v.
TVA, 3 E.R.C. 1553 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9. Much NEPA litigation is concerned with the applicability
of the statute to specific situations. One aspect of this problem is retro-
activity. A case for retroactivity is presented in Note, Retroactive
Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 MicE.
L. REv. 732 (1971). However, the courts have generally denied retro-
active application of NEPA; see, e.g., Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196(5th Cir. 1972). Even so, an impact statement is often required for ad-
ministrative agency actions already under way when NEPA took effect.
The Council on Environmental Quality guidelines make specific refer-
ence to "continuing activities." 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). Also, signifi-
cant incremental steps can themselves be treated as "major Federal ac-
tions." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325
F. Supp. 749 (ED. Ark. 1971).
Another aspect of this problem is the extent to which federal in-
volvement is needed before an impact statement will be required. If
only state funds are involved, there is no NEPA jurisdiction. Bradford
Township v. Highway Authority, 4 E.R.C. 1301 (7th Cir. 1972). Simi-
larly, Kitchen v. FCC, 464 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1972), held that NEPA
does not apply to the construction of a building to house a state regu-
lated telephone exchange despite the applicability of some federal reg-
ulations to its operation.
On the other hand, in SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189
(D.D.C. 1972), appeal filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972), NEPA
was held to apply to rate changes authorized by the ICC which affect
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ments of impact statements have not been subject to extensive
judicial construction. Prior to the Morton decision only two im-
portant issues concerning the content required in an impact
statement had been determined. In Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,'° it was held that
an agency must examine all the environmental effects of a pro-
posed action including those effects outside its regulatory pur-
view. The court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers" held that in an impact statement for a dam, the
alternative of leaving the river alone and doing nothing must be
considered.
The Government's first contention in Morton, that NEPA re-
quirements are satisfied by a listing of alternatives without dis-
cussion of their environmental consequences, was quickly re-
jected. The court of appeals found that the legislative history
and the guidelines promulgated by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality indicated that NEPA was intended to require that
alternatives be developed in sufficient detail to permit reasoned
choices on the part of subsequent decision makers.12 However,
the amount of discussion which constitutes the basis for a rea-
soned decision is subject to a "rule of reason"1 3 or a construction
of "reasonableness.' 4 Thus, the court noted that where environ-
mental effects are insignificant a brief statement of them is suf-
ficient.15
Second, the Government contended that alternatives which
an agency is without power to implement need not be discussed.
Since oil import quotas involve national security and are beyond
the authority of the rnterior Department, the Government argued
the shipment of materials for recycling. This interpretation of NEPA
would require an impact statement for virtually every action affecting
federally regulated industries. This approach to NEPA is strongly crit-
icized by Cramton in Joint Hearings on the Operation of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Before the House Comm. on Public
Works and the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong.,
2d Sess., ser. no. 92-H32, at 416-17 (1972).
10. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
12. 458 F.2d at 834. See 115 CoNG. REc. 40419-20 (1969). The
Council on Environmental Quality guidelines provide: "Sufficient anal-
ysis of such alternatives and their costs and impact on the environ-
ment should accompany the proposed action through the agency review
process in order not to foreclose prematurely options which might have
less detrimental effects." 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725 (1971).
13. 458 F.2d at 834.
14. Id. at 837.
15. Id. at 834.
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that it was unnecessary to examine the environmental conse-
quences of their removal or modification.'" In rejecting this rea-
soning, the court noted that the environmental impact statement
has the dual purpose of aiding in the agency decision-making
process and providing environmental information for Congress,
the President and the public.' 7 This latter, broader purpose re-
quired an examination of alternatives which would not ordinarily
be considered in internal agency decision making.1 8
The obligation, however, does not require the discussion of
remote or speculative alternatives. The proposed sale of off-
shore leases in Morton was designed to help meet energy needs
for the next ten years. Environmentalists urged the discussion
of the possible development of oil shale, coal liquefaction and gasi-
fication and geothermal reserves. The court found that although
these alternatives held great promise for the future, they were not
currently viable, and therefore no discussion of them was neces-
sary. Alternatives not available within the timespan of the pro-
jected action need not be considered. 0
Third, the Government argued that a previous congressional
determination that offshore development is urgently needed and
that oil import quotas are essential to the national defense over-
rides the NEPA requirement that projects be examined in the
light of alternatives. The court held that NEPA imposed an
obligation to re-examine all previous declarations of congressional
or executive policy if significant harm to the environment may
result from federal action in furtherance of that policy. The
court concluded no other interpretation of the requirement of the
act would comport with the NEPA objectives of
government coordination, a comprehensive approach to envi-
ronmental management, and a determination to face problems
of pollution "while they are still of manageable proportions
and while alternative solutions are still available .... 20
Judge MacKinnon, in dissent, urged that the decision-making
official be required to discuss only those alternatives which he
16. Id.
17. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
835 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
18. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For criticism of this position see Cramton,
supra note 9, at 421-22.
19. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
20. Id. at 836.
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had the authority to enforce.2 1 Although it would be desirable
to have environmental review undertaken by officials with the
authority to effectuate the various alternatives considered, the
environmental impact of major projects rarely corresponds to the
authority of existing federal agencies. The majority, attempt-
ing to give some guidance for the future, suggested that the
preparation of environmental impact statements dealing with
broad problems should be assigned to agencies with correspond-
ingly wide authority. In this case, initial review of the proposed
sale of offshore oil leases could have been given to the Energy
Subcommittee of the Domestic Council.2 2 The court suggested
that a sweeping review of effects and alternatives first be under-
taken by an agency with broad authority before establishing a
general policy. Then, specific projects designed to implement the
general policy should be thoroughly examined by the agency di-
rectly involved in the project. Its review may incorporate by
reference the conclusions reached in the previously issued broad
impact statement.23
It should be noted that NEPA merely mandates a set of
procedures; it does not require the agency to reach a substan-
tively pro-environment result.24  The role of the judiciary is
limited to overseeing the procedures and does not extend to
second guessing administrative agencies on substantive mat-
ters.2 5 Expansive procedures and full consideration of environ-
mental effects will no doubt promote more balanced and well
reasoned decisions.
There is a corresponding danger resulting from the exten-
sion of responsibility dictated by Morton. An overly expansive
21. Id. at 840-41. Judge MacKinnon also indicated that the policy
set forth in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act should be given
great weight and that considerations of national security ruled out the
need to consider the elimination of oil import quotas.
22. Id. at 835. The Domestic Council is the White House overseer
of domestic cabinet level policy.
23. Id. See also Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp.
731 (D. Conn. 1972), which held that to satisfy NEPA there must be a
broad impact statement for the whole of a proposed highway; impact
statements dealing with the various segments of the highway separately
do not provide a sufficient assessment of the environmental conse-
quences and possible alternatives.
24. The view that NEPA creates substantive rights championed in
Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230
(1970), has been rejected by the courts. See GREEN, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IN THE COURTs 3-4 (1972).




interpretation of the procedural requirements of NEPA might
necessitate so much time and effort as to completely inundate ad-
ministrative agencies in additional paperwork. Such a result
would ill serve environmental values, which can best be protected
by vigorous regulation.26 Furthermore, a congressional back-
lash either in the form of restrictive amendments to NEPA or of
exempting specific projects from its provisions is a real possi-
bility. This is not to ignore that without the type of constraints
imposed by Morton agencies will in some instances do no more
than go through the motions of an environmental review to reach
a pre-ordained conclusion. However, an effective attack upon
such bureaucratic malaise will usually require direct political ac-
tion to restructure and re-orient the agency in question rather
than the limited review available in the courts.
The requirement that alternatives outside the decision mak-
ers' competence be considered could easily pose an unreasonable
burden if applied indiscriminately. In dealing with a major proj-
ect, such as the sale of offshore oil and gas leases, it is necessary
to obtain a perspective view of the environmental consequences of
all practical alternatives. However, acquiring a broad overview
will be more nuisance than guidance in dealing with a small proj-
ect. For example, it would be absurd to be forced to consider
the merits of rapid transit in an environmental impact statement
dealing with ten miles of new highway.
The "rule of reason" imposed in Morton, relative to the ex-
tent to which alternatives must be discussed, should be extended
to reach this problem. The court in Morton implied as much in
stating:
When the proposed action is an integral part of a coordi-
nated plan to deal with a broad problem, the range of alterna-
tives that must be evaluated is broadened.27
In determining the breadth of alternatives that require con-
sideration under the rule of reason, the magnitude of the project
should be the first component. With experience, administrative
agencies and courts should be capable of dividing projects into
rough classifications based upon the types of alternatives that
must be considered in environmental review.
The vagueness of NEPA28 makes it necessary to develop
26. Cramton, supra note 9, at 420-21.
27. 458 F.2d at 835.
28. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs
Co-ordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971). In Hanly Judge Feinberg referred to NEPA as "a
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these distinctions on a trial and error basis. Unfortunately, it is
procedurally inefficient to require issuance of an impact state-
ment, review of its adequacy in the courts and to permit subse-
quent delay in those cases where a second impact statement
must be prepared in accordance with judicial opinion. Clearly,
Morton demands a greater degree of advance planning by gov-
ernment agencies and regulated industries.29 Nonetheless, the
number and variety of federal projects makes the establishment
of specific standards for the content and scope of environmental
impact statements a legislative impossibility. A judicial balanc-
ing approach, similar to that followed in Morton, may be the best
available course.
Finally, it is not at all certain that the task facing environ-
mental groups seeking to challenge federal actions has been made
substantially easier by Morton. A challenge can be based upon
either the failure to discuss one or more practical alternatives or
upon the failure to provide adequate detail in support of a rea-
soned choice among alternatives.3 0  The burden of establishing
either the practicality of an esoteric alternative or the fact that
an agency relied upon inadequate supporting data in reaching its
conclusion is likely to be a difficult one to carry.
statute whose meaning is more uncertain than most, not merely because
it is relatively new, but also because of the generality of its phrasing."
29. Other NEPA decisions may also contribute to this develop-
ment. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.
1972) and Note, Environmental Impact Statements-A Duty of Indepen-
dent Investigation by Federal Agencies, 44 U. COLo. L. REv. 161 (1972).
The expanded effort will result in expanded costs. See the estimates
of losses from nuclear power plant down time in Murphy, The National
Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist
Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 962, 969
(1972). Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d
783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971), held that responsible opposing views must be
considered; it follows logically that this requirement applies to sug-
gested alternatives as well. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455
F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), emphasizes the necessity of public participa-
tion in NEPA proceedings.
30. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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